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Abstract
We analyse the liberal ethics of noninterference applied to social
choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society
and inspired by John Stuart Mills conception of liberty, is examined.
The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents
after changes in their situation that do not a¤ect others. An impos-
sibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule
that satises unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must
be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches
in social choice and political philosophy.
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The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as
are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour
to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg (T. Je¤erson, 1785, Notes on the State of Virginia,
ed.1982, New York, Norton, p.159)
1 Introduction
Liberal principles in philosophy and social choice express some notion of
autonomy that individuals in society should enjoy. In this paper we examine a
specic kind of autonomy, couched as a negative freedom. We argue that from
a purely liberal perspective this freedom is justied (likely in conjunction with
many additional freedoms). Our aim is to show that granting individuals this
freedom is highly problematic. The di¢culty takes on the form that is typical
in social choice theory: if the freedom is granted, then either social choices are
not Pareto optimal (social preferences contradict the unanimous agreement
of all individuals), or there must be a dictator in society (social preferences
always conform with those of one individual).
The main liberal principle is presented in section 2. It expresses the
right of the individual to veto society from reversing its choices against her
preferences after a change of circumstances that concerns (for the better or
for the worse) only that individual and nobody else (in the sense that all
the others are indi¤erent to whether the change takes place or not). We call
this principle Non-Interference.1 For example, suppose that x and y are two
social states and that society strictly prefers x. Suppose that x0 and y0 are
exactly the same as x and y except that individual i has su¤ered a damage
(both at x and at y). For example, there has been a water inltration in her
house, either because of negligence or by sheer bad luck. All other individuals
are indi¤erent (in terms of their self-interested preferences) between x and
x0 and between y and y0. In this case, according to Non-Interference, society
should not switch strict preference to y0 over x0 against is wishes.
The boundaries of Non-Interference are discussed in section 3. The prin-
ciple is logically weak in that it does not constrain social choice in a number
of situations. Society may or may not support a change that i would prefer
to take place: the principle says nothing about that. The principle is also
1In what follows, we use capitals in order to refer to our Principle of Non-Interference.
When we discuss liberal views in general, we write noninterference.
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silent if there exists even a single agent (except for i) who does not remain
indi¤erent in the move from the unprimed to the primed alternatives. Non-
Interference identies a set of minimal conditions under which an individual
has a right to make society remain passive after a change in her situation that
leaves everybody else una¤ected. Unlike Sens [38] famous Minimal Liberty
axiom, it does not assign absolute rights over pairs of alternatives: it does
not identify a personal sphere over which individuals have a (positive) right
to have their preferences respected, regardless of other agents preferences.2
While Non-Interference captures a view that, we think, can hardly be
rejected on liberal grounds, in section 4 we trace back the broad intellectual
origin of the principle more specically to a classical source, namely John
Stuart Mills essay On Liberty [27].3 Non-Interference formalises some of
the fundamental insights of the Harm Principle, namely the idea that soci-
ety should not interfere with individual choices whenever the latter have no
(harmful) e¤ect on others. Mill insists that the reasons for the change in cir-
cumstances of the individual (such as neglect, irresponsibility, e¤ort or luck)
are not relevant information for social judgements, provided that nobody else
is negatively a¤ected. In its negative prescription, the Harm Principle cap-
tures a foundational aspect of liberalism, and one that is often endorsed even
by people who do not subscribe to a liberal philosophy. For example, the
much discussed notion of sustainable development has a no-harm avour
when it is dened (in the Brundtland report) as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their needs" (Brundtland et al. [6], p.43).4 And a key principle
of modern criminal law is that nobody should be punished unless she causes
signicant harm (nullum crimen sine iniuria).5
In section 5, we prove that it is not possible to grant the negative freedom
incorporated in the Principle of Non-Interference without infringing on the
basic democratic principles of unanimity and non-dictatorship. Our analysis
here continues a research programme we started in [23] and [24] within a
welfarist framework. The arguments of this paper go signicantly deeper,
2For a more thorough discussion, see section 5.2 below.
3References to this work will be given in the text simply as (chapter.paragraph).
4Wolf [51] provides a thorough analysis of intergenerational justice from a liberal per-
spective. See also Wallack [49] for an approach based on the Harm Principle.
5In a recent contribution, Goodin and Jackson [14] argue that a concern for negative
freedom rationally requires the maximisation of expected noninterference. See also the
discussion in Sen [39].
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as they dispense altogether with the welfarist assumption: individual util-
ities are not postulated to constitute su¢cient information to derive social
preferences. Once stripped of its welfare clothes, the nature of the conict
between principles becomes much starker. The key for this breakthrough is
the understanding that a crucial aspect of the Harm Principle lies precisely in
forbidding non-welfarist arguments to determine social preferences in certain
circumstances. Hence, the assumption of welfarism turns out to be in fact
redundant.
We also discuss many new conceptual points and in sections 6 and 7 we
analyse the philosophical implications of the conict of principles unveiled by
the clash between Non-Interference and the democratic principles of unanim-
ity and non-dictatorship. We argue that the impossibility result highlights
important and di¢cult issues for liberal democratic approaches. In particu-
lar, we take it as showing that democratic social choices logically require us
to consider some individual actions as relevant even when they do not a¤ect
others. In section 8, we suggest a possible way out of the impossibility by a
weakening of Non-Interference that retains some important liberal intuitions,
although at the cost of partially limiting the denition of the individual pro-
tected sphere.
2 The Principle of Non-Interference
We analyse the relation between liberal principles of noninterference and de-
mocratic rules in the standard social choice theoretic format of transforming
individual preference orderings into a social preference relation over social
states.6 Before we present our main principle, two important points should
be made, concerning the formal and conceptual framework of the analysis.
First, following standard practice in social choice theory, we interpret a
social state x as providing a complete description of the world, which includes
everything that may be relevant for individual and social evaluation.
Second, there are many possible interpretations of the statement "social
state x is (individually or socially) preferred to social state y" and di¤erent
concepts of individual and social preferences can be adopted.7 In this paper
we shall not opt for a specic interpretation and focus instead on the general
formulation. Alternative approaches will lead to di¤erent interpretations of
6We discuss the social choice theoretic approach to liberalism in section 6.2.
7See, for example, the classic discussion in Sen [41], [42].
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the axioms, and of our main result. As Sen [41], [42] has forcefully argued,
this versatility is a major advantage of the social choice theoretic framework,
and we shall return to this issue in the concluding sections.
To illustrate the basic idea behind the liberal principle analysed in this
paper, we break it down into two separate subprinciples, which are of in-
dependent interest. The rst subprinciple is called the Individual Damage
Principle. We use a simple example representing individual preferences over
alternative social states.
The Individual Damage Principle
Consider a society with two individuals, Me and You, and four social
states, x; y; x0 and y0.8 Our preference rankings over these states are indicated
in the table below, where a higher listed state is strictly preferred to a lower
listed one, and states at the same height are indi¤erent:
Me You
x y; y0
x0 x; x0
y
y0
Consider rst the social choice between x and y. Suppose that (for what-
ever, perhaps non-welfarist, reason) society agrees with me rather than with
you, so that x is strictly socially preferred to y.9 Now consider a change
to states x0 and y0. I am worse o¤ at each of these states compared to the
corresponding states x and y. You, on the contrary, are perfectly indi¤erent
between y0 and y, and between x0 and x.
What should the social preference between x0 and y0 be?
We submit that in any noninterfering view of society, the following argu-
ment should apply. I su¤ered some sort of damage at x0 and y0 compared
to x and y, respectively, while you are completely indi¤erent. The cause of
such damage is not claried. It might, or might not, have been a result of my
8We consider two-person examples only for deniteness and with no loss of generality.
All of our arguments continue to hold if You is interpreted as everybody else.
9The initial conguration of individual preferences over the alternatives in this example
(and in all examples below) is arbitrary: it is chosen only as a concrete illustration of the
principle. The key point is that society initially strictly prefers x to y but nothing depends
on the fact that this coincides with my own preferences, or that it conicts with yours.
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negligence. Perhaps I did not work hard enough, or failed to insure myself.
Perhaps it was just bad luck. Be that as it may, you were not involved either
by my bad luck or by my negligence. As far as you are concerned, the choice
between x0 and y0 is exactly the same as the choice between x and y. So,
we argue, a liberal society should not reverse the strict preference between
x and y to a strict preference for y0 over x0 unless this switch does not con-
tradict my preferences. In this case, I prefer x0 to y0, so society should not
choose y0 over x0. Switching the social preference to y0 in this case would
imply a further damage for me in addition to the damage that I su¤ered
because of the change from unprimed to primed social states. This would be
a kind of social punishment: not only was I harmed by the change in social
states, moving down in my preference ranking from x to x0, but the very act
of choice by society implies additional harm, making me move even further
down in my preference ranking from x0 to y0.
How could such a social sanction be justied? Only by examining the
nature of the change in social states, and by construing an argument to the
e¤ect that I deserved the adverse change in social preferences (for example,
because I was reckless, or because I caused social opprobrium). The point of
a (Millian) liberal view is that such examination and argument are irrelevant
whenever, like in this case, nobody else was harmed. In such cases, society
should not interfere against me. In the situation depicted, the rest of society
is completely indi¤erent, hence in particular it was not harmed.10
The Individual Benet Principle
The Individual Damage Principle captures only part of the intuition be-
hind Non-Interference. In fact, from a liberal point of view, there appears
to be nothing special about the fact that I su¤ered a damage. Had I expe-
rienced a benet, the same arguments made above would remain valid. The
crucial point is that everybody else is entirely indi¤erent to the change in
social state, be it good for me or not. That is, an Individual Benet Principle
should also apply.
Consider the same initial situation of choice between x and y as above,
and assume again that society prefers x to y. Now consider a change to a
10If the adverse change in my situation were caused by your choices, there may be some
room for nonwelfarist concerns. However, the existence of actions taken by you that a¤ect
me, but do not a¤ect you in any preference-relevant way, is highly implausible. Perhaps
more importantly, even in such case, it would seem all the more desirable to impose that
y0 be not strictly preferred to x0 as a minimal requirement of justice.
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situation in which the choice is between two di¤erent states x00 and y00 in which
I have gained some sort of benet instead of su¤ering a damage, compared
to the corresponding states x and y, while you are completely indi¤erent to
the change. So, our preferences are now represented by the table below:
Me You
x00 y; y00
x x; x00
y00
y
What should the social preference between x00 and y00 be? The ethical
arguments provided to defend the Individual Damage Principle extend nat-
urally (in a liberal view) to this latter example. The Individual Benet
Principle says that society should not reverse the strict preference between x
and y to a strict preference for y00 over x00, possibly except when the switch
accords with my own preferences - which is not the case here, since I prefer
x00 to y00. In other words, I can veto society from switching to a state that is
ranked lower in my preferences after a change that I prefer to the status quo
and that does not a¤ect anybody else in any preference-relevant way. Not
to grant this veto power would allow a type of (harmful) social interference
- without in exchange preventing any harm or granting any benet to others
- that runs exactly contrary to a liberal ethics.11
The Principle of Non-Interference
The Principle of Non-Interference is simply the conjunction of the Indi-
vidual Benet and the Individual Damage Principles.
Non-Interference is thus the principle according to which an individual
has the right of vetoing society from turning against her preferences in all
circumstances of change (for the better or for the worse) for her with respect
to which other individuals are indi¤erent.12
11We further discuss the Individual Benet Principle in section 8 below.
12The Principle of Non-Interference is rigorously stated in section 5 below and it is
translated into the formal language of social choice theory in appendix A.
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3 A Victorian library example
To shed further light on the implications of Non-Interference, suppose that
the examples above depict the social choice concerning access to public li-
braries in the Victorian era. We now represent preferences with ordinal utility
functions and x specic values. This is both for deniteness, and because it
helps us to clarify the di¤erences between the liberal noninterfering views in-
corporated in our principle, and alternative approaches in social choice (such
as utilitarianism, Rawlss di¤erence principle, and so on). Yet, to repeat,
nothing in our analysis depends on the possibility of representing individual
preferences with utility functions.
Let the previous individual preferences over x; y; x0 and y0 be summarised
in the table below, whose entries are ordinal utility numbers:
Me You
x 10 
y 7 
x0 8 
y0 6 
Suppose that I enjoy reading, but I am poor and can only buy very few
books: 10 is the (ordinal) utility number representing my preferences for
state x where, among other things, access to public libraries is free, while
7 is the (ordinal) utility number representing my preferences for state y in
which society takes an action I dislike, such as a restriction of access to
public libraries - either in the form of a general policy (e.g., census-based
membership, given that I am poor); or ad hominem (e.g., directly against
me, for whatever reason). All other things, except access to libraries, are
held constant at x and y.
Next, consider x0 and y0, and the corresponding ordinal utility numbers.
They may arise in a number of possible ways: I have lost my job, due to
a general economic downturn, and with no fault of my own; or my house
has burnt down, and I had failed to insure myself; or perhaps I have found
Charles Darwins "The Origin of the Species" on a bench and read it. Then
8 is my utility in situation x0 in which I have access to libraries, while 6 is
my utility in situation y0, in which society restricts my access to libraries.
Note that I am worse o¤ at x0 and y0 compared to x and y, respectively:
this is obvious if I have been laid o¤, or my house has burnt down, but it
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may happen even when I nd the book, if, for example, reading it leads to
a crisis in my religious and moral beliefs.13 Observe further that the book is
not borrowed from the library and thus the decision concerning access bears
no direct relation with my reading the book.
Your preferences over x and y (and over x0 and y0) are analogously ex-
pressed by the ordinal utility numbers  and , respectively, and we leave
them unspecied. Perhaps you are rich and do not value reading very much,
and so would rather have restricted access to public libraries ( > ). But
maybe not, and our preferences over the alternatives coincide ( < ). Your
ranking of the unprimed (and, indeed, of the primed) alternatives is not cen-
tral for our liberal principle. What does matter is that you regard the choice
between x and y in exactly the same way as the choice between x0 and y0:
you are indi¤erent between situation x and x0 (respectively, y and y0) which
both give you a ordinal utility of  (respectively, ).
Then, the Individual Damage Principle stipulates that if society chose
open access when I was employed, or my house was still intact, or I had not
read the book, then my bad luck, or negligence, or even my action of reading
the book should not lead to a change in social preferences. In any case,
I should not be penalised - for being unemployed, or for losing my house,
or for reading the book - given that nobody is involved in any way that is
preference-relevant.
Two key features of Non-Interference should be noted. First, crucially,
the principle is not liberal in the sense of prescribing open access to pub-
lic libraries, that is, it does not require that x be socially preferred to y.
The choice between x and y may, or may not be in the individuals "pro-
tected sphere": Non-Interference is silent about that. Unlike Sens [38] fa-
mous Minimal Liberty axiom, it does not assign absolute rights over pairs of
alternatives.
Second, the principle aims to capture only some aspects of noninterfering
13Or maybe, after reading the book, I utterly dislike it, or even if I do like it, some of
my acquaintances decide to stop socialising with me (even if they are not directly a¤ected
by knowing that I read it), so that the net e¤ect of reading the book on my welfare may
be negative. In Mills theory, generalised moral reprovation and enforcement via moral
coercion following my reading the book are not justied, and the Harm Principle is meant
to protect agents from the tyranny of public opinion as much as from legal coercion.
Yet, people have no duty to interact with me and in reading the book I may incur "the
inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgement of others"
(On Liberty, IV.6).
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views of society, and it does not impose any constraints on social choice in
a number of cases. If social preferences over x and y were di¤erent, then
the principle would be silent. If society originally preferred y over x, maybe
it should compensate me for the damage by switching to a preference for
x0 over y0. But maybe not. Similarly, if I preferred y0 to x0, the principle
would also be silent on whether I should be compensated by a switch in social
preferences to coincide with my own. Further, the principle is silent in cases
when your welfare changes, too: if you are a¤ected, this may provide prima
facie ground for interference. But maybe not. Because we do not aim to
provide a complete liberal theory of government, the axiom is appropriately
silent on these controversial cases.14
Let us emphasise once again a crucial point: we do not aim to provide
a complete theory of liberalism. Non-Interference captures only some (in
our opinion quite minimal) implications of liberal views. The principle is
formulated as a purely negative prescription: it requires noninterference in a
set of social settings, but it does not characterise all the situations in which
noninterference is morally required, and thus it provides no guidance as to
when interference is indeed legitimate.
For the Individual Benet case, I prefer x00 and y00 to x and y, respectively.
Maybe I won a lottery; or I have nally been able to solve a di¢cult math-
ematical problem; or I have found Gustave Flauberts "Madame Bovary"
on a bench and thoroughly enjoyed reading it. You, instead, are indi¤erent
between x00 and x, and between y00 and y. As before, let us translate these
preference statements into the ordinal utility statements summarised in the
following table:
Me You
x00 11 
y00 8 
Then 11 describes my utility in state x00 in which I have access to libraries,
while 8 describes my utility in state y00, in which society sanctions me - for
winning the lottery, or for solving the mathematical problem, or for picking
up the book and reading it - by restricting my access to libraries.15 In any
14For a discussion of the necessary and su¢cient conditions for interference in classical
liberalism, see, for example, McCloskey [25]; Berger [3]; Feinberg [10]; and Rees [32].
15Again, we assume that the book is not borrowed from the library and thus the decision
concerning access bears no direct relation with my reading the book.
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case, Non-Interference stipulates that if society chose open access when I had
not won the lottery, or the problem was still unsolved, or I had not read the
book, my good luck, or e¤ort, or even my action of reading the book should
not lead to a change in social preferences. I should not be penalised given
that nobody else is involved in terms of preferences, so that, in particular, no
harm for others was caused. Again, the principle is not liberal in the sense
of prescribing open access to public libraries, that is, the principle does not
require that x be socially preferred to y.
In the light of this discussion, it is important to emphasise that Non-
Interference aims to incorporate some key liberal intuitions, and so it may
conict with di¤erent normative views on distributive justice. For there may
be many nonliberal reasons for society to switch from a strict preference for
x over y, to a strict preference for y0 over x0, or for y00 over x00. Our choice of
translating preferences into ordinal utility numbers can help us to illustrate
this point, in the above examples.
Suppose rst that  = 1 and  = 3:5. Then one may argue that although
society strictly preferred x to y, it should strictly prefer y0 to x0. This could
be justied, for example, on classical utilitarian grounds, for the sum of
individual utilities is higher at x than at y but it is lower at x0 than at y0.
Suppose next that  = 7:5 and  = 20. Then one may argue that
although society strictly preferred x to y, it should strictly prefer y00 to x00.
This could be justied, for example, on Rawlsian grounds, for the welfare of
the worst o¤ individual is higher at x than at y but it is lower at x00 than at
y00.
In either case, Non-Interference may appear as an objectionable restric-
tion as it requires ignoring all information concerning the size of the changes
in welfare, and their potentially relevant implications for total utility or
for the welfare of the worst o¤. The key point to note here is that Non-
Interference is simply not meant to capture utilitarian, Rawlsian, egalitarian
or other intuitions: it aims to incorporate some liberal views of autonomy
and protection from interference. The individualistic and non-aggregative
nature of Non-Interference (focusing on changes in the situation of a single
agent while keeping everyone else indi¤erent) is precisely meant to capture
widely shared liberal views. Indeed, from a liberal perspective, it is not even
obvious that properties concerning informational invariance and comparabil-
ity of utility should play any role. As Sen argues, the claims of liberty need
not be "signicantly contingent on interpersonal comparisons. The force of
ones claims over ones private domain lies in the personal nature of that
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choice - not on the relative intensities of the preferences of di¤erent persons
over a particular persons private life" (Sen [43], p.364).16 For this reason we
have formulated Non-Interference purely in terms of ordinal preferences.
4 The liberal roots of Non-Interference
It seems hard in general to nd liberal objections to Non-Interference. But we
think that Non-Interference does indeed positively capture some substantial
aspects of classical liberal and libertarian approaches. This section outlines
the conceptual relations between Non-Interference and a principle that is
central in the liberal literature, namely John Stuart Mills Harm Principle,
and also some interesting links with entitlement theories of justice. The
aim is not to show that Non-Interference is a full formalisation of the Harm
Principle; nor that it captures all  or even most  of the tenets of liberal and
libertarian approaches. Rather, we argue that Non-Interference incorporates
some important intuitions shared by liberal and libertarian thinkers.
Consider for example Mills classic statement of the Harm Principle:
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others ... The only part of the conduct of anyone,
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute." (On Liberty, I.9).
What does exercising power against somebodys will mean in our frame-
work? It corresponds to society switching its ranking of social states in a
way that is contrary to the individuals preferences. It is hard to deny that
any exercise of power against ones own will runs against ones preferences.
As Isaiah Berlin put it in his famous discussion of Mills theory, "all coercion
is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such" ([4], p.128, italics
added).
In his examples, Mill focuses especially on instances of damage to the
individual: "he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if
16See also Sen [39], [40]. Indeed, one may argue that "libertarian rights clearly involve
protection of the rightholder from the e¤ects of interpersonal comparisons of intensity with
respect to his private kind of utility" (Riley [33], p.1140).
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he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to
spoil it further" (On Liberty, IV.7). In our terminology, he seems particularly
keen on the Individual Damage Principle. But upon closer reading, Mills
Harm Principle itself has really nothing to do with whether changes are
positive or negative for the individual concerned: his choice of examples is
merely a rhetorical device that is related to the audience he was keen to
persuade.
Mills argument is that it is inappropriate to interfere with free individual
choices even when they are objectionable (from another individuals view-
point): the agent will be the subject of generalised disapproval, or disdain,
but nothing else. He wants to make his point as stark as possible even in
those cases that may have been more controversial for his Victorian readers.
In fact it is clear that Mill thinks that the Individual Benet Principle
should also hold, for example in the passage quoted earlier, when he says
"In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute". Here he does not mention damage at all, but merely the fact that
the events under consideration concern only the individual himself (which
we express formally with the indi¤erence of everybody else to the change,
except for the individual concerned). So a similar principle must apply,
from a liberal perspective and almost certainly in Mills view, to preference-
enhancing decisions, acts, or events that do not a¤ect others. This is captured
by the Benet part of Non-Interference.
There are, however, some important conceptual di¤erences between Non-
Interference and Mills Harm Principle. In particular, because our principle
prescribes that society should remain passive only in those situations when
everybody else is exactly indi¤erent to changes in the circumstances of the
individual, Non-Interference is logically weaker than the Harm Principle, in
that it explicitly prevents intervention in a smaller set of social circumstances.
In fact, a literal reading of the Harm Principle would prevent interference
when everybody else is benetted by the change and even in some situations
in which changes in one individuals conditions negatively a¤ect others, for
not all changes to social states that are ranked lower in some individuals
preferences count as harms in Mills approach - for example, a simple distaste
or dislike does not constitute harm (Riley [34], pp.98-99; Arneson [2], section
1). In these cases, Non-Interference imposes no restriction on social choice,
while Mills Harm Principle requires society not to interfere, even though
other individuals are not completely indi¤erent.
To be sure, these considerations are crucial in order to determine the
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precise scope of liberal noninterfering views, and we grant that there may
well be changes in social states to which other agents are not indi¤erent that
a liberal would not count as harms, so that the conclusion that y0 should
not be strictly preferred to x0 would stand. Yet our aim is to highlight a
deep conict between some key democratic values and the core of a liberal
noninterfering view of society. For this purpose, we need not dene the ex-
act boundaries of the individuals protected sphere. On the contrary, it is
desirable to focus on the logically weakest principle that captures one funda-
mental insight: whatever other situations there may be in which individuals
should be protected, if all other agents are indi¤erent to the change in social
states a¤ecting an individual - whatever its source - then there is no ground
for interference.17
Another aspect of Mills description of the Harm Principle that our for-
malisation does not pay attention to is that the former is sometimes couched
in agency terms, e.g.:
"the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection." (On Liberty, I.9, italics added).18
The agency aspect is not made explicit in our framework, but this is
not essential to our analysis of the Harm Principle. Mills analysis aims
to establish a protected sphere for self-regarding conduct, a more general
concept than action per se, and there are many forms of interference that
are objectionable from a liberal, Millian perspective, which do not a¤ect an
agents liberty of action or where the crucial agency decision does not rest
with the individual herself (see, for example, Riley [34]; Jacobson [17]; and the
discussion in Sen [42], pp.141-2). All relevant forms of unwanted interference
will have some preference implications. Besides, as already noted, we aim to
capture only some aspects of the Harm Principle. Our principle rules out
interference only in a core of social situations, namely when interference runs
17Our focus on this core of social situations also allows us to eschew all discussions of
the di¤erence between "private and public versions of the harm principle" (Danley [8],
p.420) as well as between harm caused by action and harm caused by inaction (see, e.g.,
Berger [3], p.255¤ and Wellman [50]). By assuming that the other agents are indi¤erent,
the axiom assumes all types of harm away and makes these distinctions less relevant in
our analysis. We further discuss the notion of harm in section 7.2.
18In the general context of Mills theory, self-protection is not to be interpreted literally,
and may be extensively understood to refer to well-being and not strictly to physical
integrity only.
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contrary to the individual preferences. Formally, Non-Interference admits
interference that goes in the direction of the individual preference, in the
form of a compensation or support, though even these forms of interference
might be inadmissible in a liberal view.
The previous discussion highlights the broad conceptual relation between
Non-Interference and Mills Harm Principle. Yet, in closing this section, it
is worth stressing again that the notion of noninterference is central in all
classical liberal and libertarian approaches, and our axiom captures some
widely shared intuitions. In libertarian theories, protection from interfer-
ence is the essential ingredient of (legitimately acquired) private property,
and negative rights (such as those incorporated in our axiom) are founda-
tional (Nozick [29], [30]; Danley [8]; Wolf [51]; Arneson [2]). In Lockes
theory, noninterference on property follows from noninterference on peoples
individual attributes and choices, as it derives from the rights correlated to
self-ownership. In entitlement theories of justice, a central role is played by
the so-called Lockean proviso, according to which the initial appropriation of
natural resources in the state of nature is legitimate if there is enough and
as good left for others (Nozick [30]; Kymlicka [19]; Arneson [2]). The force
of the proviso arguably derives from its being an application of the Harm
Principle: if there is enough and as good left for others, then appropriation
cannot possibly harm them, and thus nobody can complain or demand in-
terference on property claims.19 Noninterference is also implicated in the
transfer of property: if it is voluntary and without externalities, it causes no
harm and therefore should not be interfered with.
A possible interpretation of the notion of noninterference in these ap-
proaches is the standard Paretian view: any voluntary transactions (without
externalities) are denitionally Pareto-improving and so they should be pro-
tected from interference. In a social choice framework, if x is preferred to y
by two transacting agents, while leaving everybody else una¤ected, then x
should be socially preferred to y. Indeed, the Lockean proviso itself may be
reformulated as requiring that the appropriation of natural resources does not
cause a state that is lower in somebodys preference ranking: in the Lockean
state of nature, let x be the social state where private acquisition of some
resource is allowed and let y be the social state where it is not. Then, the
19As Wolf ([51], p.799) has persuasively argued, "The proviso functions to stipulate
conditions in which this presumptive claim [to property] will be undefeated, or overriding,
and will therefore impose duties of noninterference on others". See also Gibbard ([13],
pp.28-30); Kymlicka ([19], p.308); and Arneson ([2], pp.329-330).
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Lockean proviso could be interpreted as stating that private acquisition is
legitimate if everybody prefers x to y (see, e.g., Miller [28] and Wolf [51]).20
Non-Interference is quite di¤erent and, in a sense, weaker in that it does
not stipulate conditions for x to be socially preferred to y. Rather it imposes
a form of consistency on libertarian judgements: whatever the (possibly non-
welfarist) libertarian criteria that may lead to x being socially preferred to
y, Non-Interference species some conditions under which the same (possi-
bly nonwelfarist) libertarian criteria apply and social judgement should not
change in a way that is adverse to individuals. Consider again the issue of
the appropriation of natural resources in the Lockean state of nature. Sup-
pose that the choice between x and y in the numerical examples in section
3 above is a choice between allowing me to appropriate a natural resource
(x), or not (y). For example, I grab a plot of land and then subsist on it. If
society prefers x to y, then it follows that whatever I get from the resource,
or whatever luck (misfortune) I have with it, if nobody else is a¤ected by my
acts or decisions (due perhaps to the limited economic interactions and the
abundance of natural resources in the state of nature), and if I still prefer to
appropriate the resource, society should not actively prevent me from doing
it. Given that everybody else is indi¤erent, the legitimacy of my acquisition
would not be diminished by my spoiling or depleting the resource, regardless
of the source of change in welfare for me from x and y to x0 and y0.
5 The impossibility of Non-Interference
Consider a society with a set N of individuals. A generic individual in this
society is denoted with the letter i. Let X denote the set of conceivable
social states that must be ranked by society, and assume that each agent
has a given preference ordering over alternatives in X, denoted generically
as x and y, which represent conceivable social states. An alternative x in
X provides an exhaustive description of the world, including everything that
may be relevant for either individual or social evaluation. We conceive of
the collective choice problem in the standard way: we aim to identify some
20This could be imagined as the outcome of a sequential process in which one analyses
private acquisition by one agent at a time and a series of Pareto-improving acquisitions
take place; if some acquisition is not Pareto-improving - there is not enough and as good
left for others, - then the process stops and private property is not legitimate. Under
transitivity, the two approaches are logically equivalent.
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desirable properties that any social ranking of alternatives should satisfy, for
a given set of individual preferences.21
The following two axioms are standard. They incorporate widely shared
views on the democratic nature of social choice, namely the principle of
unanimity in collective decision making and the idea that no individual shall
have his or her own preferences prevail in all possible choices:
Weak Pareto: For any two social states x; y, if all agents strictly prefer x
to y, then x must be strictly socially preferred to y:
Non-Dictatorship: For every agent i, there exist two social states x; y
such that i strictly prefers x to y but society weakly prefers y to x.
Next, we introduce the main principle incorporating a liberal view of
autonomy and noninterference:
Non-Interference: Starting from two social states x and y for which x is
strictly socially preferred to y, consider two di¤erent social states x0 and y0
such that
(1) either agent i strictly prefers x to x0 and y to y0, or she strictly prefers
x0 to x and y0 to y;
(2) everybody else is indi¤erent between each state x; y, and the corre-
sponding primed state, x0; y0;
(3) agent i strictly prefers x0 to y0.
Then society should not reverse the strict preference between x and y to
a strict preference for y0 over x0.
The three conditions dened so far are incompatible.
Theorem 1 : There is no social preference ordering that satises Weak
Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, and Non-Interference.
A formal proof of Theorem 1 is in appendix A, but the logic of the im-
possibility result can be illustrated by means of the following two-person
example.
21At a formal level, it is worth noting that our impossibility result is demonstrated in
the context of a given prole of individual preferences - the so-called single-prole setting
- rather than in the classical Arrovian multi-prole framework with many varying indi-
vidual preference proles (see Fleurbaey and Mongin [12] and Feldman and Serrano [11]).
None of the conditions of our impossibility result (Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, and
Non-Interference) cuts across di¤erent preference proles. We discuss some implications
of our framework in section 7.1 below.
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5.1 The neighbouring (almost) desert islands
Andrea is young, vegetarian, and loves hiking and meeting new people (but
she does not wish to live with anyone). Bob is middle-aged and does not
enjoy company, but has a passion for beer and shing. They live in two
di¤erent islands and each of them is the only inhabitant of their island. The
two islands are su¢ciently far apart that, on the whole, they can live their
lives independently, but they are su¢ciently close that a number of decisions
must be taken collectively.
In particular, Andrea and Bob have to take two decisions concerning the
management of the canal between the islands.
Consider rst the choice between two social states x and y, where the only
di¤erence between the two states is that in x a boat with a large number of
young people partying is allowed to sail along the canal, whereas in y it is
barred from the canal. Let the following utility proles represent individual
preferences over the two states (as before, this is only for deniteness and
illustrative purposes, and utility numbers are a mere representation of ordinal
preferences).
The boat trip
Andrea Bob
x 25 12
y 10 23
Next, they have to choose between two social states p and q, where the
only di¤erence between the two states is that in q Bob is allowed to sh in
the canal, whereas in p he cannot. We represent the agents preferences over
these states with the following utility proles.
Fishing in the canal
Andrea Bob
p 15 18
q 7 27
When it comes to choosing between x and y, and between p and q, their
preferences conict: Andrea would like the boat to sail in the canal, and to
ban shing, while Bob ranks the options in exactly the opposite way.
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They reject dictatorial social arrangements and so decide to adjudicate
these conicts so that each of them has their most preferred choice respected
once. Without loss of generality, suppose that Andreas preferences dominate
in the choice between x and y, while Bobs preferences are relevant in the
choice between p and q. Hence, they decide to allow Bob to sh in the canal
and the boat to sail by.
In other words, x is (strictly) socially preferred to y and q is (strictly)
socially preferred to p.22
Now consider a change from states x and y to two di¤erent states x0 and
y0 which a¤ects only Andrea: perhaps she has broken her leg while hiking in
a well-known dangerous spot; or maybe she has been forced to hunt due to
a disease that has destroyed all edible plants in her island. Thus, she prefers
each of the original states x and y compared to the corresponding proles x0
and y0. Bob, instead, does not care at all whether the state is x0 or x, and
whether the state is y0 or y:
Andrea Bob
x0 14 12
y0 9 23
Similarly, consider a change from states p and q to two di¤erent states p0
and q0 which a¤ects only Bob: perhaps a hurricane has destroyed his dwelling;
or maybe he has fallen ill after trying to distil an alcoholic drink from a plant
growing in his island. He prefers each of the original states p and q to the
corresponding new states p0 and q0. Andrea, instead, does not care at all
whether the state is p0 or p, and whether the state is q0 or q:
Andrea Bob
p0 15 16
q0 7 21
What should the social preference between the alternatives be? Can
Andrea and Bob design a liberal democratic social decision rule that incor-
porates both unanimity and a noninterfering view?
Because they had decided to allow Bob to sh in the canal, then by
Non-Interference they should not switch to forbidding it. To do this after
22As proved in appendix A, the assumption that q is strictly socially preferred to p
and that x is strictly socially preferred to y entails no loss of generality because by Non-
Dictatorship and Weak Pareto two such pairs always exist.
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Bob has fallen ill, or has seen his dwelling destroyed would be an unjustied
punishment for Bob, given that Andrea is una¤ected. Therefore q0 should be
(weakly) socially preferred to p0.
Similarly, by Non-Interference, deciding to forbid the boat to sail by af-
ter Andrea has broken her leg, or has had to hunt against her vegetarian
convictions would be an unjustied punishment for her, given that Bob is
una¤ected. Therefore x0 should be (weakly) socially preferred to y0.
Observe, however, that they would unanimously strictly prefer p0 to x0,
and y0 to q0, and this brings them to a deadlock. For they end up with
a social preference cycle: p0 is strictly preferred to x0 (by Weak Pareto),
which is weakly preferred to y0 (by Non-Interference), which is in turn strictly
preferred to q0 (by Weak Pareto), which is - nally - weakly preferred to p0
(by Non-Interference).23
5.2 Non-Interference and Minimal Liberty
It is instructive to compare our result with Sens [38] classic contribution. In
Sens [38]Minimal Liberty axiom, liberalism is formalised as the requirement
that an individual has a sphere of complete control on societys preferences
over minimal subsets of social states. Sens Impossibility of the Paretian
Liberal can thus be interpreted as identifying a contradiction between the
Pareto principle as a democratic rule (unanimity) and a respect for absolute
libertarian rights (Riley [33]). We follow Sen by identifying a conict between
democratic rules (the unanimity principle and nondictatorship) and a liberal
right (to Non-Interference), but unlike Sen the conict is not due to a pre-
assigned physical sphere which is of exclusive competence of the individual.
In our approach it is not the nature of the social states that denes individual
freedom: it is the fact that the rest of society does not care about certain
social states.
Conceptually, Sens axiom captures individual autonomy by dening a
sphere of positive freedom, overriding in principle concerns about other peo-
ples preferences. This is an important di¤erence from our Principle of Non-
Interference, which embodies a notion of personal autonomy in terms of
negative freedom, namely as the protection from interference under certain
23The Neighbouring (almost) desert islands example is only meant to illustrate the
impossibility and it is based on a specic initial conguration of individual preferences. As
argued in appendix A, the same conclusion holds for any initial conguration of individual
preferences.
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circumstances not involving others (that is, in the language of preferences,
circumstances to which others are indi¤erent). Similarly, if Sens Minimal
Liberty axiom is understood as a "social choice formulation of rights" (Sug-
den [45], p.128¤), then it can be interpreted as assuming the existence of
a personal sphere over which individuals have a right to have their prefer-
ences respected, regardless of other peoples preferences. In the language
of rights, the Principle of Non-Interference would capture a di¤erent, and
arguably weaker type of right, namely the right to be protected from ad-
verse changes in strict social preferences, when others are una¤ected in any
preference-relevant way.
Formally, one way to read Non-Interference is as a local decisiveness
condition. Sens Minimal Liberty, for example, asserts that an individual i
must be decisive at least on one pair of alternatives. Non-Interference asserts
that an individual i must be decisive on every pair of alternatives that is
reached through certain precedents (society has already demonstrated a
strict preference between x and y and the only change involved concerns i
alone). The individual is decisive not because of the nature of the alternatives
but on the basis of the ranking of society itself in another situation which is
identical to the one under consideration when seen from the viewpoint of all
other members of society. Once again, observe how the required individuals
decisiveness is weak since she cannot prevent societys indi¤erence in the face
of her strict preference.
A nal point worth noting is that in the interpretation (but not in the
formulation) of Minimal Liberty, if two states x and y are in individual is
protected sphere, they are identical except for something that only concerns
i. In a sense, Non-Interference makes this ceteris paribus intuition explicit
by laying out the condition that everybody else be indi¤erent except i. But
the di¤erence between the two axioms incorporating liberal principles is by
no means purely conceptual. A social decision rule that declares all conceiv-
able alternatives, x; y, to be indi¤erent violates Sens Minimal Liberty in that
it rules out the existence of a minimal protected sphere over which individ-
ual strict preferences are respected. However, it satises Non-Interference
because - denitionally - it never switches strict social preferences against
any individual.
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6 The axiomatic approach to noninterference
We have formalised a Principle of Non-Interference applied to social choice
and studied its implications. Theorem 1 proves that there is an inconsistency
between liberal approaches to social decision making, as captured by the Prin-
ciple of Non-Interference, and the basic democratic principles of unanimity
and non-dictatorship. The next question, then, concerns the implications
of this inconsistency for liberal approaches. For "The impossibility ... just
brings out a conict of principles ... The really interesting issues relate to the
implications of the conict. There are implications both for the evaluation
of outcomes and for choice of decision procedures" (Sen [41], p.28).
One possible answer is that the impossibility actually has no signicant
implications for liberal democratic approaches. Two alternative lines of ar-
gument can be adopted to that e¤ect. One may deny that our axiomatic
framework is relevant to analyse the liberal doctrine of noninterference. Al-
ternatively, even granting that the conceptual framework of the analysis is
appropriate, one may argue that the specic axioms adopted do not ade-
quately capture our liberal or democratic intuitions, and can be dropped or
easily weakened, thus yielding possibility results.
In this section, and in the next, we analyse the two objections in turn
and defend the relevance of Theorem 1 for liberal democratic approaches.
6.1 The existence of self-regarding acts
It might be objected that all meaningful individual acts have an e¤ect on
others,24 and so Non-Interference is empirically irrelevant. In Mills own
words: "No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person
to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief
reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them" (On
Liberty, IV.8). In the Victorian library example in section 3 above, other
agents - for example, people holding strong views on morals, - might be
a¤ected by my reading the book, or by my not having insured the house, or
maybe even by my being unemployed, and therefore they would not remain
indi¤erent between the (primed and unprimed) alternatives.
This criticism is not specically aimed at our principle, though, and it
is typically moved to all liberal views based on some version of the Harm
24See, for example, the discussion in Rees ([32], pp.171¤).
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Principle. If correct, it would indeed be quite damaging for such liberal
approaches but, if anything, from a theoretical viewpoint it would reinforce
our critical analysis. Perhaps more importantly, ours is a logical inquiry into
the consistency of liberal approaches accepting one of their core premises,
whereas the criticism focuses mostly on an empirical issue, which aims at
disputing the relevance of the premise itself.
From a logical viewpoint, it is certainly possible to draw a meaningful
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding conduct, and the idea
that all conceivable events or acts have signicant e¤ects on others is not
plausible. It would be odd to care about the toothpaste brands used by other
people (with the possible exception of the marketing director at Colgate). All
the classical normative Sen examples of others activities that people should
not care about according to a liberal view could be used in a positive sense:
it is a matter of fact that people normally do not care about whether others
sleep on their belly or what colour they paint their walls. Many actions
of this type acquire signicance only because they are attached a moral or
symbolic value, while continuing to materially leave other people una¤ected:
imagine that sleeping on ones belly contravened some religious obligation.
Many liberals have defended the view that an empirically meaningful
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts exists.25
6.2 The social choice approach to rights
A di¤erent objection may be that the Principle of Non-Interference does not
properly capture an essential aspect of liberal views. In particular, as in the
case of Sens Minimal Liberty axiom, it may be argued that the social choice
interpretation of (liberal) rights is inappropriate (see, e.g., Sugden [45] for
an articulate critique26). On this view, liberal approaches require a purely
procedural formulation of rights and thus cannot be captured in a social
choice framework, especially in a preference-based context. "Rights do not
determine a social ordering but instead set the constraints within which a
social choice is to be made, by excluding certain alternatives, xing others,
25See, for example, the discussion in Berger ([3], p.243¤) and Riley ([34], chapter 9). One
context in which the distinction seems particularly meaningful concerns intergenerational
justice since not all actions of the present generation have e¤ects on removed generations
(certainly not on predecessors, but likely also on successors).
26See also McQuillin and Sudgen [26] for a state of the art mathematical formulation of
the procedural approach to rights.
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and so on" (Nozick [29], p.62). This is not the place for a thorough review
and discussion of the criticisms of social choice theoretic analyses of liberal
approaches.27 But three points should be made here to suggest that they are
not conclusive in general, and in particular that they do not provide solid
ground to reject Non-Interference.
First, it is doubtful that textual evidence supports the idea that all of
the relevant aspects of Mills theory can be properly captured only by a
purely procedural formulation of rights, where "the focus of attention is on
the procedures of social choice and not on the outcomes of those procedures"
(Sugden [45], p.132). In many passages in which Mill argues for liberty
he explicitly rejects this view. In the opening pages of his essay, Mill writes
that "It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived
to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of
utility" (On Liberty, I.11). Even more explicitly, Mill goes on to say that
"I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must
be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man
as a progressive being" (On Liberty, I.11). And although the consistency
between his analysis of liberal principles and his utilitarian approach has
been questioned, a number of scholars have forcefully argued that Mill is
best interpreted as a "utilitarian liberal" (see, e.g., Riley [33], [34], Gray
and Smith [15], Wallack [49]). Furthermore, in Mills own formulation, the
Harm Principle is concerned with actions that a¤ect other peoples welfare,
and not only their rights or freedoms, and "the formula coercion to prevent
coercion used by some liberals is distinct from Mills coercion to prevent
harm" (McCloskey [25], p.147).28
Therefore, while Mill obviously did not take a position on the social choice
analysis of liberal rights, such an analysis seems at least consistent with Mills
overall philosophical approach and can capture some key aspects of his doc-
trine of liberty, even granting that it does not capture it in its entirety. Our
formulation of Non-Interference, for example, is precisely meant to incorpo-
rate the consequentialist, if not straight welfarist (or preference-based) as-
pects of Mills approach. Consider the alternatives x and y in the antecedent
of the axiom. It may well be that x was strictly socially preferred to y because
of the nature of the alternatives (and not merely because of the preferences
27The literature here is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. We refer the
reader to the excellent discussion in Sugden [45] and the references therein.
28After all, according to Mill, "liberty consists in doing what one desires" (On Liberty,
V.5, italics added).
24
or utility conguration). Hence, in principle, as the choice between x0 and
y0 involves di¤erent alternatives, a non-welfarist might well prefer to switch
to a preference for y0 over x0. What Mill is saying is that, in the circum-
stances described, certain non-welfarist arguments are not valid: whatever
non-welfarist argument was given to socially prefer x to y, this argument
must still stand for x0 and y0, given that all other individuals are una¤ected.
The lack of harm to others (note well, an itself welfarist, or preference-based
proposition) possibly justies ignoring certain non-welfare features of the so-
cial states (e.g. the moral opprobrium inherent in the actions that cause
them).29
Second, the defence of a purely procedural formulation of rights is not
entirely convincing. Even in deontological approaches such as Nozicks, con-
siderations about outcomes do play an important (albeit possibly implicit)
role, and this is true in particular for those aspects that relate to noninter-
ference. Consider, for example, the Lockean proviso, according to which the
initial acquisition of unowned resources is justied as long as enough and
as good is left for others of the resources appropriated. Locke himself de-
fends the relevance of the proviso by claiming that, given the abundance of
natural resources at his time, acquisition could take place "without straiten-
ing anybody" (Second Treatise on Government [20], Chapter V, Sect. 36),
which naturally lends itself to a preference-based, if not straight welfarist
interpretation.
Miller ([28], p.406-7) actually argues that the relevant part of the proviso
is as good, rather than enough, and that as good should be interpreted in
welfarist terms. In Nozicks theory, "the crucial point is whether an appro-
priation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others" (Nozick [30],
p.175) and many authors have argued that a (broadly dened) preference-
based approach provides the most promising interpretation of the proviso,
which solves a number of conceptual di¢culties, such as those related to het-
erogeneous land or to the rights of future generations (see, e.g., Sanders [36];
Wolf [51]), which would make it virtually impossible to satisfy the proviso.30
29As noted in section 4 above, not all changes in social states that adversely a¤ect
agents in terms of their preferences count as harms in Mill. However, this is not relevant
for our discussion here because insofar as nonwelfarist considerations count in Mills Harm
Principle, they make it logically stronger than our Principle of Non-Interference. Hence,
whatever its philosophical relevance, this argument cannot provide a strategy to avoid the
impossibility result.
30See, for example, Miller ([28], pp.406¤) and the discussion in Kymlicka ([19], pp.308¤).
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In general terms, the rationale of the Lockean proviso may be stated as re-
quiring that "no individual be made worse o¤ (in some appropriate sense)
by the appropriation (compared with the situation before appropriation)"
(Vallentyne [47], p.7).31,32
Third, even granting the importance of procedural aspects in the de-
nition of liberal noninterfering principles, nothing prevents them to be in-
corporated into a social choice theoretic framework. As Sen [41], [42] has
convincingly argued, in fact, the interpretation of the social preference rela-
tion need not focus exclusively on the intrinsic characteristics of the social
states and can incorporate a social judgement of the process yielding certain
outcomes. "One of the advantages of the general social-choice formulation of
liberty is the opportunity that the representational exibility of social choice
gives to bring in alternative interpretations, depending on the nature of the
problem being discussed" (Sen [42], p.144).
Thus, the Principle of Non-Interference can be interpreted consistently
with the libertarian emphasis on procedures if, for example, the social pref-
erence relation reects also a judgement about procedures, or if one adopts
a "normative-choice interpretation" (Sen [41], p.6). In the former case, Non-
Interference should be interpreted as saying that, given the way in which
society arrived at the decision between x0 and y0, - including, crucially, the
other agents indi¤erence to the change from the unprimed states, - then y0
should not be regarded as strictly better than x0. In the latter case, the
interpretation in terms of liberty as control (Sen [41], p.17) is even clearer:
Non-Interference says that decision making in society should be so arranged
Sanders ([36], p.380, fn.18) actually argues that Nozick suggests an interpretation that
might make use of indi¤erence curves .
31A welfarist approach is even more cogent in left-libertarian approaches, which
strenghten the proviso by requiring that compensatory payments be made. See, e.g.,
Steiner [44] and Vallentyne [47].
32This is not to say that procedural aspects are irrelevant in the analysis of liberal non-
interfering views. As Sen [43] argues, one should distinguish an opportunity aspect of
liberty (liberty helps us achieve what we would choose to achieve in our private domains);
and a process aspect of liberty (liberty leaves us directly in charge of choices over private
domains, no matter what we may or may not choose). The opportunity aspect (charac-
teristic of the social choice approach) is certainly not su¢cient but "It is also important
to avoid the opposite narrowness of concentrating exclusively only on the process aspect
of liberty ... Important as processes are, this cannot obliterate the relevance of the op-
portunity aspect which too must count. Indeed, the importance of e¤ectiveness in the
realization of liberty in ones personal life has been recognized as important for a long
time" (Sen [43], p.364).
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that an individual has the right of vetoing society from choosing against her
preferences in all circumstances of change for her to which other individuals
are indi¤erent.
In summary, we come back to the point that Non-Interference does not
capture all that is relevant in a liberal, or libertarian, approach. Rather, by
focusing on a very specic and restricted set of congurations of alternatives,
and thanks to the versatility of the social choice theoretic framework, Non-
Interference does incorporate some core liberal insights concerning the right
of individuals to be protected from unjustied interference.
7 Objections
Even if one accepts the social choice theoretic framework as appropriate to
analyse rights and the liberal notion of noninterference, it may be objected
that the specic axioms chosen do not adequately capture the key tenets
of liberalism and the essential aspects of democratic procedures, and can
be dropped or easily weakened, thus yielding possibility results reconciling
the key intuitions of liberal and democratic approaches. In this section, we
analyse various possible objections to our axioms and show that they do not
provide the foundations for satisfactory ways out of the impossibility result.
7.1 Democratic procedures
One reason why the conict of principles identied by Theorem 1 might be
deemed not very damaging for liberal democratic approaches is that our con-
ception of democratic procedures is considered inadequate or too stringent.
We shall examine three sets of objections.
Completeness
One way to avoid the inconsistency is to drop the requirement that the
social preference relation be able to rank all possible alternatives. This may
be a way of acknowledging that in societies characterised by signicant het-
erogeneity of preferences and values, there may well be choices that are ex-
tremely di¢cult to adjudicate. Yet, at a theoretical level, this does not
represent a solution to the conict of principles. It is rather a way of bypass-
ing it by declaring society unable to choose in those situations that create
the conict. A similar objection can be moved to any attempt to avoid the
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impossibility by weakening or dropping the transitivity of the ranking, or our
condition that the economic environment be su¢ciently rich (see appendix
A).
Unanimity
The Pareto principle is widely considered as a fundamental principle cap-
turing both a notion of economic e¢ciency and a basic tenet of democratic
decision-making. Yet, the clash between Minimal Liberty and Weak Pareto
has been famously interpreted by Sen as suggesting "the unacceptability of
the Pareto principle as a universal rule" (Sen [39], p.235). On this basis, he
argues against the "mechanical use of the Pareto rule irrespective of context"
(Sen [39], p.219): Weak Pareto embodies a (limited) welfarist perspective and
does not incorporate any information concerning the sources of preferences
(and utility) and the motivations underlying them. The classic example con-
cerns sadistic preferences, but more generally, following Dworkin ([9], p.234)
one may distinguish two types of preferences of an individual: "a personal
preference for his own enjoyment of some goods or opportunities, or an ex-
ternal preference for the assignment of goods and opportunities to others."
Then one may argue that only personal preferences should have moral weight,
while external preferences (whether based on political, moral or purely psy-
chological motives) should be discarded. More generally, "The fundamental
issue really is whether individual preference orderings alone provide enough
of a basis for a social judgment without going into the causation of and the
motivation behind these preferences" (Sen [39], p.226).
A comprehensive discussion of Sens criticism of the Pareto principle and
of welfarism, and of the vast literature it has generated goes well beyond
the boundaries of this paper; but two points should be made here that are
directly relevant to our discussion.
First of all, it is not immediately clear that a compelling case for aban-
doning the Weak Pareto principle can be easily provided. Or, more pre-
cisely, that such argument can be constructed within the (classical) liberal
approaches analysed in this paper. One basic liberal principle is precisely
respect for peoples autonomously developed views and tastes, and the idea
of preference autonomy is fundamental in liberal (and not only) approaches
(Rawls [31], p.448; Harsanyi [16], p.55) and it is foundational in Mills own
rejection of paternalism and in his defence of the Harm Principle: "He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
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to do so would be wise or even right" (On Liberty, I.9).
Of course, respect for individual preferences does not mean that society
should necessarily act on those preferences when it comes to collective choices.
"The reasons ... for excluding moral and antisocial preferences from the
determination of individual utility functions are not strictly inconsistent with
[the Pareto] principle, because they do not assert that the fulllment of these
preferences is not good for the individuals in question. All that is asserted
is that these preferences have no claim on us - that is, on society - for
their fulllment. Denying that they have such a claim need not involve
telling people what is good for them - it represents a moral judgment, not
a judgment of value that is in conict with theirs" (Scanlon [37], p.28).
The moral force of this argument, however, arises in situations when
individual interests conict. We may ask what preferences give rise to a moral
claim when the interests of di¤erent individuals clash and some are required
to make a sacrice for others, or the satisfaction of external preferences would
harm (in some relevant sense) others. But the key point here is precisely that
there is no such conict in the case of a Pareto improvement (especially in
the sense of Weak Pareto): no one requires anyone else to make a sacrice
and no one needs to assert a moral claim over anyone else.
"To reject a Pareto superior outcome [x] for a Pareto inferior outcome [y]
because we disapprove of the preferences that make [x] the Pareto superior
outcome would fail to show liberal respect for the principle of preference
autonomy. We would be telling individuals that they should not seek to
satisfy their preferences, even if no one objects, because we do not respect
their preferences. This intrusion into individuals intrapersonal comparison
of values would seem inconsistent with liberal principles" (Chang [7], p.211,
italics added).
Second, Sens [38] impossibility of a Paretian liberal raises doubts on
Weak Pareto because it uncovers a direct conict between a non-welfarist
axiom incorporating a minimal view of liberalism and the Pareto principle,
and because the conict arises from meddlesome preferences. Neither issue
arises in our analysis. For, at the logical level, Non-Interference and Weak
Pareto are not in conict: the adoption of the liberal principle does not
automatically lead to the violation of unanimity, and so unlike in Sen [38],
there is no direct trade-o¤ between the two axioms. At the conceptual level,
the impossibility result does not arise from the clash between a non-welfarist
liberal principle and the weak form of welfarism embodied in Weak Pareto
because, as we have argued above, Non-Interference itself incorporates some
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relevant welfarist (or, more precisely, preference-based) considerations.
Moreover, it is unclear that the type of preferences that individuals have
plays any role in the impossibility uncovered in Theorem 1 above. For-
mally, unlike in Sen [38], our result does not depend on the Unrestricted
Domain assumption, which requires that all logically conceivable combina-
tions of preferences are possible, and which yields Sens impossibility result
when some individuals have meddlesome preferences. Our framework is a
single-prole one: instead of assuming a social decision rule that converts
all preference proles into a social ordering (while respecting some desirable
properties that possibly cut across di¤erent proles), we have xed a set indi-
vidual preferences. Our properties apply to that given prole, but our result
holds for any given prole, provided the set of alternatives is su¢ciently rich:
meddlesome preferences, or indeed any preference externalities play no role
in the analysis. More generally, the impossibility result would still stand if
we interpreted agents preferences as laundered preferences to exclude all
morally objectionable, meddlesome, nonliberal views. But then, unlike in
Sens case, it is not clear what criterion one might adopt to qualify the Weak
Pareto principle: certainly not any weakening would do, while an unqualied
abandonment seems undesirable.
As Sen himself forcefully put it, "there is something very central in the
idea that preferences unanimously held by all members of a community can-
not be rejected by that community" (Sen [39], p.235).
Dictatorship
A di¤erent objection is that not all dictatorships are problematic in our
single-prole framework. In the standard Arrovian context, the existence of
a dictator implies that there is an agent whose ranking between any two pairs
of alternatives prevails for any possible prole of preferences - an obviously
undesirable property. In a single-prole world, instead, there are situations in
which the presence of dictators does not seem in contrast with a democratic
ethos. For example, according to our Non-Dictatorship axiom, agents who
are indi¤erent between all alternatives are trivially dictators, and so are all
agents in society whenever they all have exactly the same preferences and
Weak Pareto is satised. Similarly, under majority voting, if a majority of
the population have identical preferences, they are all dictators according to
our axiom. These forms of dictatorships seem hardly objectionable and may
raise doubts on the implications of our results, or - more deeply - on whether
our Non-Dictatorship axiom properly captures our intuitions on democratic
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procedures.33
This conclusion is unwarranted and the implications of Theorem 1 main-
tain all of their normative force. At a general theoretical level, it is true that
in a single-prole world there may be - in principle - some preference proles
such that dictators are not of great moral concern. This happens when the
dictator has no real inuence on social outcomes, for example, because there
is no real conict of interest as all agents have identical preferences, or the
dictator actually has no strong views about alternative allocations. Yet The-
orem 1 continues to hold in situations in which people do have strong views
about social choice and desirable allocations, and their preferences are in
conict, and the existence of a dictator is indeed problematic in these cases.
Formally, our analysis holds for any given prole of preferences, and "while
in some cases an innocuous dictatorship is acceptable, in many other cases
it is very much unacceptable" (Feldman and Serrano [11], p.22).
Moreover, our assumption on the structure of alternatives rules out the
innocuous dictatorships: by assuming the context in which choices are made
to be su¢ciently rich, we can focus on the core situations of interest for demo-
cratic approaches, namely those where democratic procedures are necessary
to adjudicate deep conicts due to signicant heterogeneity.
Therefore, as in the standard Arrovian context, dictatorships involve "(1)
in politics, an extreme sacrice of participatory decisions, and (2) in welfare
economics, a gross inability to be sensitive to the heterogeneous interests of
a diverse population" (Sen [43], p.351, italics added).
7.2 Harmless wrongdoings
Even if one concedes that the social choice approach to liberal rights is not
fundamentally misguided in general, one may still object specically to the
standard consequentialist reading of the Millian doctrine of liberty in terms
of harm to others - which underlies also our Principle of Non-Interference
- and question harm-based approaches in favour of a rights-based approach
to liberalism. In particular, various authors have recently argued that Mills
theory does not depend on the possibility of acts that have no impact on
others: Mill holds that certain acts are within individuals rights, because
they are of a type with regard to which individuals need liberty in order
33The discussion of Innocuous dictatorships in this subsection draws from the thorough
analysis in Feldman and Serrano [11].
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to develop their individuality, which is a prerequisite to human happiness.34
The fact that some acts do or do not harm others is irrelevant in order to
determine whether they belong to the individual protected sphere (Berger
[3], especially chapter 5; Vernon [48]; Jacobson [17]; Ripstein [35]).
The rights-based approach to the liberal doctrine of liberty raises many
complex and important issues, both exegetical and philosophical. In the
rest of this section, we shall discuss only those aspects of the rights-based
approach that are directly relevant for our discussion.
Two preliminary points should be made in this respect. First, exegetical
issues are not central for our arguments, for our aim is not to provide a
complete formal interpretation of Mills doctrine of liberty. The Principle
of Non-Interference captures some important (and widely shared) liberal
and libertarian intuitions, and it is of su¢cient interest in itself to warrant
investigation. It is important to note, however, that the discussion in section
4 above is well grounded exegetically and Non-Interference has clear liberal
roots that can be traced back to Mills theory. Indeed, as admitted also
by critics, the consequentialist reading of the Millian doctrine of liberty in
terms of harm to others (which underlies our Principle of Non-Interference)
represents the standard interpretation of Mill.35
Second, whether or not harmful acts are su¢cient as prima facie grounds
for intervention is certainly an important issue in a liberal theory of the
state (Jacobson [17]) and specically in criminal law (Ripstein [35]). But it
is totally irrelevant, both formally and theoretically, in our analysis. The
Principle of Non-Interference identies a necessary condition for interference
(in a liberal perspective) and the conict with the democratic principles of
unanimity and the absence of dictators does not arise from the specication
of conditions under which the state should intervene in individual a¤airs.36
The fundamental question, then, is whether harm is a necessary condition
for individual acts to be prima facie subject to social scrutiny, as in the stan-
34See the discussion of Mills concept of "experiments in living" by Anderson [1].
35In the standard interpretation: "From a Millian perspective, so-called harmless
wrongdoing is an incoherent phrase. ... Purely self-regarding acts, harmless to other
people, are properly beyond morality. If there is no perceptible damage to others against
their wishes, there can be no immoral act or wrongdoing. Rather, there is a moral right
to absolute liberty of self-regarding conduct" (Riley [34], p.206).
36And our focus on necessary conditions for interference is consistent with the standard
interpretation of the Harm Principle, which is only part of Mills utilitarian liberalism
and "It is properly viewed as stating a necessary but not su¢cient condition for justied
coercion" (Riley [34], p.191).
32
dard interpretation of Mill. According to critics, this is not the case and there
are harmless acts that may warrant intervention. In our context this is rele-
vant as it can be interpreted as supporting a weakening of Non-Interference:
even if no harm is done, there may be no right to a protected sphere and so
the condition in the consequent of the axiom may be violated, with a switch
in societys strict preferences against the individual. In principle, this may
provide a liberal way out of the impossibility result in Theorem 1.
Unfortunately, it is unclear that the types of harmless conduct analysed
in the literature (including harmless wrongdoings and positive obligations)
raise signicant doubts on the relevance of harm as a necessary condition
for interference in the conceptual and axiomatic framework adopted in this
paper.37 Consider the central example of harmless wrongdoing, analysed by
Ripstein [35], namely harmless trespass. "Suppose that, as you are reading
this in your o¢ce or in the library, I let myself into your home, using bur-
glary tools that do no damage to your locks, and take a nap in your bed. I
make sure everything is clean. I bring hypoallergenic and lint-free pajamas
and a hairnet. I put my own sheets and pillowcase down over yours. I do
not weigh very much, so the wear and tear on your mattress is nonexistent.
By any ordinary understanding of harm, I do you no harm" (Ripstein [35],
p.218). Nonetheless, argues Ripstein, most people would object to the tres-
pass: "Your objection is to my deed, my trespass against your home, not to
its e¤ects" (Ripstein [35], p.218). Harm is irrelevant, and the harmless act
nonetheless asks for state intervention to protect private property.
The example raises some deep issues, but in the context of our discussion
it is less than conclusive. We rst note that, even if one accepts the basic
premises of the example, including the relevant notion of harm, it is not clear
that it supports the rejection of the Harm Principle. The example highlights
a potential conict between our moral intuitions on property and the Harm
Principle. But we concur with Bird [5] that the complete absence of harm
suggests that perhaps our moral intuitions on property should be revised in-
stead. Indeed in many countries harmless trespasses conceptually analogous
to Ripsteins rather extreme example, are not forbidden.38
But perhaps more importantly, the force of the example crucially rests
37An earlier authoritative discussion of harmless wrongdoings is in Feinberg [10].
38Indeed, in Mill the liberty principle is conceptually distinguished from laissez-faire
and the protection of property, and "the principle of individual liberty is not involved in
the doctrine of free trade" (On Liberty, V.4). For a thorough discussion see Riley ([34],
pp.116¤).
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on a notion of harm that is more restrictive than mere welfare losses (or
moves to less preferred alternatives). Ripstein does not provide a thorough
explicit denition of the relevant notion of harm, but he can conclude that
the nap is harmless because he excludes the possibility that I can harm you
simply "by upsetting you when you learn of my deed, or by leading to fears
that people will do this sort of thing to others" (Ripstein [35], p.220), and
a fortiori by causing you a mere welfare loss. Negative e¤ects in terms of
individual preferences, according to Ripstein, are not su¢cient to identify
harmful acts. The reason is that if harm is interpreted more broadly (to
include all acts and choices that have adverse e¤ects in terms of individual
preferences), then the Harm principle "is not a liberal principle. If those
harms count, the harm principle underwrites many of the prohibitions it is
supposed to exclude" (Ripstein [35], pp.221-222).
In the analysis of necessary and su¢cient conditions for state interven-
tion, and a liberal approach to criminal law, an excessively broad notion of
harm encompassing all welfare losses (including mere dislike or distaste) may
well be objectionable. Yet both the nap example and our Principle of Non-
Interference focus specically on harm as a necessary condition for individual
acts to be prima facie subject to social scrutiny. From this perspective, a
broad notion of harm that encompasses mere subjective welfare losses is log-
ically and conceptually consistent with a liberal approach: if, even under
the broadest possible notion of harm, an act has no harmful e¤ect on oth-
ers, then this provides strong liberal ground to avoid interference. Indeed,
in the analysis of necessary conditions for state intervention, one may ar-
gue that a broad notion of harm is necessary in order to capture the kernel
of liberal noninterfering views. This intuition underlies our formulation of
Non-Interference and, as shown by Theorem 1, it has rather surprising and
substantive implications.39
If, consistently with our focus on necessary conditions for interference, a
broad notion of harm is adopted, it is rather unclear that my nap represents
a harmless wrongdoing. The point is not so much that the action would
be harmful in the sense that my trespass would cause a welfare loss for you
and so it should be outlawed (although it is indeed likely that my act will
39This by no means implies that the notion of harm underlying our Principle of Non-
Interference corresponds to Mills, nor does it suggest that it is the appropriate notion in
a liberal theory of the state. In dening the boundaries of state intervention, Mill clearly
holds a stronger notion of harm (see, for example, On Liberty I.12, IV.5, IV.12). For a
thorough discussion, see Ten [46], Berger [3], and Riley [33], [34].
34
have an adverse e¤ect on you in terms of your preferences). Rather, contra
Ripstein, and consistently with our approach, the example could be used to
argue that if it is really the case that my act has absolutely no preference-
relevant implications on you - in the sense of leaving you indi¤erent, - then
it is not a wrongdoing and the trespass should indeed not be interfered with,
consistently with the standard interpretation of the Harm Principle (and
with our formulation of Non-Interference). After all, my act has no e¤ects
whatsoever on you, and you are completely indi¤erent, so there is no ground
for state interference. If you do not care, why should the state?
It may be objected that there are some acts that are harmless even under
the broad construal - acts with no preference-relevant implications - and that
still raise morally relevant questions, such as acts that the o¤ended party is
unaware of. In the nap example, if you are unaware of my trespass, you are
not going to be a¤ected in any preference-relevant way, and would plausibly
remain indi¤erent. Even granting, for the sake of argument, these examples
to be relevant in the denition of criminal law, they are rather unconvincing
in our analysis of liberal principles in political philosophy and normative
economics.
As noted above, both individual and social preferences are dened over
social states, where each state provides a complete description of the world,
including everything that may be relevant for individual and social evalu-
ation. This assumption is appropriate given that we aim to analyse some
desirable properties of ideal social arrangements. From this perspective, no
ideal moral theory should be based on the agents unawareness or ignorance,
of key aspects of social states (see Sen [41], pp.19¤). This indirectly re-
ects the standard insistence in liberal approaches on "free, voluntary, and
undeceived consent and participation" (On Liberty, I.12).40
Indeed, nothing in our discussion of Non-Interference or in our examples
depends on your ignorance of what occurs to me. In other words, the fact
that you (everybody else) remain indi¤erent does not depend (either formally
or morally) on your being ignorant of what has occurred to me in moving
from the unprimed states x; y to the primed states, x0; y0. But then, given
a broad denition of harm, the examples of wrongdoings that are harmless
only because of lack of information or awareness discussed by Ripstein [35]
40Indeed, in his moral theory, Mill takes what Sugden ([45], p.140) denes a synoptic
viewpoint where moral judgements "are made as if from a single, God-like vantage point,
from which every component of the good of the world can be seen in its proper proportion".
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lose much of their normative relevance - at least for our Non-Interference
axiom. If ignorance is not assumed, however, then it is highly implausible
to assume that people who are wronged would remain indi¤erent, and so the
examples do not apply.41
We conclude this section noting that in principle positive obligations are
structurally di¤erent from the nap example, as they concern the duty to pro-
vide a benet to society and there is a potential (moral) asymmetry in the
treatment of harms as opposed to (lack of) benets (Jacobson [17]; see also
Wellman [50]). Yet, in our social choice theoretic analysis, and given the
broad notion of harm adopted in our formulation of the Principle of Non-
Interference, this asymmetry is not relevant in making binary comparisons
between alternatives. Indeed, similar arguments as above can be put forward
to suggest that, whatever issues positive obligations raise for a comprehen-
sive liberal theory of the state, Non-Interference does capture one necessary
condition for legitimate interference.42 This is all that is needed for the
impossibility in Theorem 1 above.
8 A possible way out? Damage vs. Benet
The previous discussion suggests that it is not easy to dismiss the conict of
principles highlighted in Theorem 1 as irrelevant for liberal doctrines by re-
jecting our main axioms altogether on either empirical or theoretical grounds.
Non-Interference does capture relevant aspects of liberal approaches and The-
orem 1 does highlight a deep conict between liberal noninterfering views and
the democratic principles of unanimity and the absence of dictators.
From this perspective, we interpret our arguments and the theorem "as
guideposts to the creation of a more acceptable theory of liberal democracy"
(Riley [33], pp.1135-6). In particular, we take them as a demonstration that
it is impossible to take social choices in democratic institutions without some-
how considering at least some individual actions as relevant even when they
only a¤ect only one individual. Social judgements cannot treat individuals as
41Ripstein ([35], p.218) notes that in Mill "harm can be identied independently of
knowing how it came about". Given our broad interpretation of harm, this is entirely
consistent with our argument here which only stresses the awareness of the harm itself,
not knowledge of its origin.
42It is extremely unlikely, to say the least, that if I do not meet a positive obligation,
this has no preference-relevant e¤ect on you.
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separate entities even if these individuals themselves do nothing to interfere
with others.
Short of giving up unanimity, then, the question is how to weaken Non-
Interference so as to retain some key liberal intuitions. Let us focus on
the Individual Benet Principle. One possible objection is that this part of
Non-Interference contradicts some liberal intuitions. Consider the example
in section 2 above. Imagine that alternatives x and y are such that in y I
am taxed, whereas in x I am not, and suppose that (for whatever reason)
x is strictly socially preferred to y. Suppose next that I suddenly become
richer due to brute luck and with no e¤ort on my own part: on the basis of
the Individual Benet Principle, I could resist any attempt to pay even one
penny of taxes on my additional income.
This may seem prima facie unreasonable and one may object that the
Individual Benet Principle fails to properly capture liberal views. For one
may argue that, while agents can keep the fruits of their labour and e¤orts,
pure windfalls should be shared. There are two reasons why this objection
appears unconvincing to us. First, it is worth emphasising again that I have
a rather weak veto power which indeed allows for the possibility that in the
end - perhaps after a fair coin toss - society does opt for taxation (y0) because
Non-Interference does not rule out the possibility of a switch to indi¤erence
after my windfall gain.
Second, the view that individuals are not entitled to any gains due to
brute luck is common in some liberal egalitarian approaches but it is far
from being salient in classical liberal and libertarian views, especially if one
notes, once again, that whatever change occurs to me does not a¤ect anybody
else. For "the libertarian accepts the idea that no one, no state, has a moral
right to enforce a redistribution of wealth or property" (Danley [8], p.419).
Although we do not think that one can reject the Individual Benet Prin-
ciple on general liberal grounds, and no distinction between the Damage and
Benet parts of the Harm Principle can be found in Mill, there is nevertheless
a sense in which going against an individuals preference after she has been
damaged is di¤erent from doing the same thing after she has benetted. The
rst course can only be construed as a punishment or as a sadistic exercise,
while the second could take a form of a correction to someones gain. While
not liberal, this form of interference could be easier to accept for a liberal
than the other, especially from a non-welfarist perspective that allows one to
scrutinise the source of the gains. As noted earlier, liberal egalitarianism, for
example, admits that pure windfalls to an individual should be shared. In
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a welfarist, level comparable setting, we have demonstrated that this leads
straight to an unusual conclusion from the liberal point of view, namely
welfare egalitarianism ([23]). In the non-welfarist context of this work, no
such conclusion is granted or even meaningful. It remains an open question
to study what limitations to social choice the Individual Damage Principle
implies in this context.
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A The impossibility result
We focus on societies with N = f1; 2g agents because they illustrate the
conict of principles in the starkest and clearest form, and without any un-
necessary technicalities. All results can be straightforwardly, if laboriously,
generalised to societies with more than two agents.43
Let X be the set of social states. Individual preferences are denoted <i
for i 2 N and are assumed to be reexive, transitive and complete binary
relations on X. A social preference relation is denoted < and it is also
assumed to be an ordering, that is, a reexive, transitive and complete binary
relation on X.
Let R (R++) denote the set of (positive) real numbers. We suppose that
the set of social states X can be written as X = T  (M1 M2), where
Mi  R++ is the set of possible quantities of a special commodity called
money that agent i may own, while T is an arbitrary nonempty set of social
states described entirely except for the money allocation. A social state
x 2 X is thus a triple x = (t;mi;mj) (note the (i; j) notation). For every
x = (t;mi;mj) 2 X, and for every m 2 R, we write
x~i m  (t;mi +m;mj) 2 X
to denote the modication of alternative x consisting of giving (or taking
away) m extra units of money to agent i, such that the modied alternative
is still in the feasible set. The following assumptions together dene a rich
economic environment:
Richness (R):
 Indi¤erence to others money (R1). For all x 2 X, all i; j 2 N , and all
m 2 R such that x~i m 2 X: x~i m j x.
43Analogously to the way in which our earlier welfarist results were easily generalis-
able from the two-agent case. See Mariotti and Veneziani [23], [24]. See also Lombardi
and Veneziani [21], [22], which extend the analysis of liberal social welfare orderings to
economies with an innite number of agents.
42
 Desirability of own money (R2). For all x 2 X, all i 2 N , and all
m 2 R such that x~i m 2 X: x~i m <i x, m  0.
 Divisibility of own money (R3). For all i 2 N and all x; y; z 2 X
such that x i y i z there exist m;m
0 2 R such that x ~i m 2 X,
z ~i m
0 2 X, y i x~i m i z, and x i z ~i m
0 i y.
Some comments are in order concerning our Richness assumption. R1
entails a society in which there is neither money envy nor money sympathy:
therefore our impossibility result is not due to any externality of this sort. In
general, unlike in Sen [38], meddlesome preferences play no role in our result.
R2 imposes a mild monotonicity assumption on individual preferences. R3
implies some sort of Archimedean continuity of individual preferences: it
states that it is always possible to vary the amount of money possessed by an
individual in such a way as to alter the ranking of any physical alternatives.
This assumption is satised if, for example, money becomes progressively
more valuable as its scarcity increases.
At a more general level, our Richness assumption plays a conceptually
similar role to the standard Diversity assumptions used in the literature on
single-prole Arrovian impossibility results (see, for example, Feldman and
Serrano [11]) in that it guarantees a su¢ciently large space of alternatives
for a given prole of individual preference relations. At a formal level, our
economic environment is similar to that analysed by Kaplow and Shavell [18]
in their pioneering study of nonwelfarist social welfare functions.
Finally, our three basic axioms for < can be formally stated as follows:
Weak Pareto (WP): For all x; y 2 X, if x i y for all i 2 N , then x  y:
Non-Dictatorship (ND): For all i 2 N , there exist x; y 2 X such that
x i y and y < x.
Non-Interference (NI): Let x; y 2 X be such that x  y, and let x0,y0 2 X
be such that, for some i 2 N ,
x0 < i x, y
0
<i y
not (x0 i x)
x0  j x and y
0 j y for j 6= i
Then y0  x0 whenever x0 i y
0.
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We can now prove the main impossibility result.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the set of social states satises R. There is no
social preference ordering < that satises WP, ND, and NI.
Proof: 1. By R2 and R3, for all i 2 N and all x,y 2 X such that x i y,
there existm;m0 2 R such that x~im 2 X, y~im
0 2 X and x i x~im i y
and x i y ~i m
0 i y.
2. We prove that if x,y 2 X are such that y 1 x and x < y, then there
exists a social state x12 2 X such that y 1 x
12, x12 2 y and x
12  y.
To see this, consider x,y 2 X such that y 1 x and x < y. By WP, it
must be x <2 y. By step 1, there existsm1 2 R such that y 1 x~1m1 1 x.
By R1, x~1m1 2 x, and so x~1m1 <2 y. Moreover, by R2, for all m2 > 0:
(x~1 m1) ~2 m2 2 x ~1 m1. Let x
12  (x~1 m1) ~2 m2. By R1, x
12 1
x ~1 m1. Hence, by transitivity of individual preferences, y 1 x
12 1 x,
x12 2 y, and x
12 2 x. Therefore, by WP and the transitivity of <, it
follows that x12  y, as sought.
3. By ND, there exist x,y 2 X with y 1 x and x < y and there exist
p, q 2 X with p 2 q and q < p. By step 2, we can assume, without loss of
generality, that x 2 y, q 1 p, x  y, and q  p.
4. There are in principle sixteen mutually exclusive, relevant cases to
consider, according to whether (i) p 1 x or x <1 p; (ii) y 1 q or q <1 y;
(iii) p 2 x or x <2 p; (iv) y 2 q or q <2 y.
Suppose rst that p 1 x, y 1 q, p 2 x, and y 2 q. Then by WP
p  x and y  q, which, by the transitivity of <, immediately leads to the
contradiction p  p.
The proof of all other cases consists of showing that, starting from any
initial conguration of preferences, it is always possible to arrive at the latter
conguration after suitable perturbations of the alternatives.
Consider, for example, the case with x <1 p, y 1 q, p 2 x, q <2 y.
By R3 and step 1, there exist m1;m
0
1 2 R++ such that q~1m1; p~1m
0
1 2
X and y 1 q~1m1 1 x and q~1m1 1 p~1m
0
1 1 x. By R1, q~1m1 1 q
and p~1m
0
1 1 p, and by R2, q~1m1 2 q and p~1m
0
1 2 p. Therefore, by
NI and the completeness of <, q~1m1 1 p~1m
0
1 implies q~1m1 < p~1m
0
1.
Let q0  q ~1 m1 and p
0  p~1 m
0
1.
By R3, there exist m2;m
0
2 2 R++ such that x ~2 m2; y ~2 m
0
2 2 X and
p0 2 x~2m2 2 q
0 and x~2m2 2 y~2m
0
2 2 q
0. By R1, x~2m2 2 x and
y ~2m
0
2 2 y, and by R2, x~2m2 1 x and y ~2m
0
2 1 y. Therefore, by NI
and the completeness of <, x~2 m2 2 y ~2 m
0
2 implies x~2 m2 < y ~2 m
0
2.
44
Let x0  x~2 m2 and y
0  y ~2 m
0
2.
By NI, we have shown that q0 < p0 and x0 < y0. However, by WP p0  x0
and y0  q0 leading again to the contradiction x0  x0 by the transitivity of
<.
It is not di¢cult to show that, for all other initial congurations of pref-
erences over p; q; x; y, a contradiction is obtained with a similar reasoning.
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